



Abstract. A number of philosophers have attempted to solve the prob-
lem of null-probability possible events in Bayesian epistemology by propos-
ing that there are infinitesimal probabilities. Ha´jek (2003) (more ten-
tatively) and Easwaran (2014) (more definitively) have argued that be-
cause there is no way to specify a particular hyperreal extension of the
real numbers, solutions to the regularity problem involving infinitesi-
mals, or at least hyperreal infinitesimals, involve an unsatisfactory inef-
fability or arbitrariness. The arguments depend on the alleged impossi-
bility of picking out a particular hyperreal extension of the real numbers
and/or of a particular value within such an extension due to the use of
the Axiom of Choice. However, it is false that the Axiom of Choice pre-
cludes a specification of a hyperreal extension—such an extension can
indeed be specified. Moreover, for all we know, it is possible to explicitly
specify particular infinitesimals within such an extension. Nonetheless,
I prove that because any regular probability measure that has infinitesi-
mal values can be replaced by one that has all the same intuitive features
but other infinitesimal values, the heart of the arbitrariness objection
remains.
1. Infinitesimal probabilities and underdetermination
Bayesian epistemology faces a difficulty with the possibility of events that
seem to have zero probability, such as a randomly aimed dart hitting the
exact center of a target or a particular ticket in a countably infinite fair
lottery being chosen. For updating one’s credence for an event A on a zero-
probability event B requires calculating the conditional probability P (A |
B) which is classically defined as P (A&B)/P (B), which in turn requires
dividing by zero. One family of solutions to the problem involves Popper
functions—i.e., taking conditional probabilities to be fundamental and not
defined as ratios of unconditional probabilities. The other family of solutions
involves extending the real number line which is classically used to provide
the values of the probability function to a totally ordered field that includes
infinitesimals—quantities α such that 0 < |α| < r for every strictly positive
real r—and then saying that the events that seem to have zero probability
but nonetheless to be possible in fact have infinitesimal probability, and
dividing by an infinitesimal to define a conditional probability will be a
perfectly well-defined process.
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In this paper, I will argue that all infinitesimal solutions to the problem
of zero-probability events suffer from an underdetermination problem: the
extended-real probability functions carry more information than is deter-
mined by the plausible kinds of constraints on these probabilities.
As is usual in probability theory, we can identify events with subsets of
a sample space Ω—the set of all options. A set F of subsets of Ω is an
algebra provided that it is non-empty and closed under complements and
finite unions (and hence finite intersections). If R∗ is a totally ordered field
extending the real numbers, then an R∗-valued finitely-additive probability
measure (“measure” for short) on F is a function from F to R∗ satisfying
the axioms:
(i) P (A) ≥ 0,
(ii) P (Ω) = 1, and
(iii) P (A ∪B) = P (A) + P (B) if A and B are disjoint.
In mathematics, one normally extends (iii) to countable additivity. However,
the most popular solutions to the zero probability problem that involve
extending the reals do not have a well-defined notion of summing a countably
infinite sequence of probabilities, and hence I am limiting the discussion to
finite additivity.
The measure P is regular provided that P (A) > 0 whenever A is non-
empty. If there are uncountably many disjoint outcomes (as in the dart
case), there will be no regular real-valued measure on an algebra of subsets
of the target that includes all these outcomes.1 And if there are infinitely
many disjoint equal probability outcomes, then finite additivity will force a
real-valued measure to assign probability zero to each outcome.2
Thus with real-valued measures, we lose regularity in at least two kinds
of situations: cases where there are uncountably many disjoint outcomes
and cases where there infinitely many (countably or not) equal probability
outcomes.
However, for any real-valued measure P on F , there is a field of hyperreals
R∗ and an R∗-valued regular measure P ∗ that is infinitesimally close to P ,
i.e., P ∗(A) − P (A) is always zero or infinitesimal.3 For convenience, I will
1Let the Ei for i ∈ I be the disjoint outcomes where I is uncountable. For each
integer n > 0, let In = {i ∈ I : 2−n < P (Ei) ≤ 2−n+1}. If the set In has at least 2n
members, then there will be 2n disjoint outcomes each with probability bigger than 2−n,
and their union by finite additivity will then have a probability greater than 2n · 2−n = 1,
which is impossible. So, each set In has less than 2
n members, and in particular is finite.
But I is the union of the In, since for any i ∈ I, there is an integer n > 0 such that
2−n < P (Ei) ≤ 2−n+1, as P (Ei) > 0. Hence I is a union of countably many finite sets,
and hence is countable, contrary to the assumption.
2For suppose that the probability of each one of these disjoint equal probability out-
comes is α > 0. Then for any finite n, the probability of the disjunction of n of them will
be nα by finite additivity. But for any positive real number α we will have nα > 1 if n is
sufficiently large, whereas all probabilities must be between 0 and 1.
3E.g., Benci, Horsten and Wenmackers (2018) show that there is a regular measure Q
on F taking values in a field of hyperreals. Let α be any infinitesimal in that field, and
UNDERDETERMINATION OF INFINITESIMAL PROBABILITIES 3
write x ≈ y to mean that x − y is zero or an infinitesimal. Note that
hyperreals are always an extension of the reals.
Moreover, there is a sense in which anything you can do with Popper
functions, you can do with infinitesimals, in the sense that if P (· | ·) is
a Popper conditional probability function (see McGee 1994 for definitions)
then there is a field of hyperreals R∗ and an R∗-valued measure P ∗ such that
P (A | B) ≈ P (A ∩ B)/P (B) whenever B is non-empty (see Krauss 1968,
McGee 1994 and Brickhill and Horsten 2016). Thus, any assignment of con-
ditional probabilities that is consistent in the sense that it can be extended
to a Popper function can be modeled by hyperreal-valued probabilities.
There are a number of problems with the infinitesimal probability solution
to the non-regularity problem. Regular infinitesimal probabilities fail to
preserve intuitive symmetries (Williamson 20074; Pruss 2013b). The same
problem occurs for Popper functions, however (Pruss 2015). Failures of
countable additivity in applications to countably infinite fair lotteries lead to
paradoxes of non-conglomerability for non-conditional probabilities, whether
real- or hyperreal-valued (Pruss 2018), and hence also for Popper functions
which agree with non-conditional probabilities when one conditions on the
whole space. But of course failures of non-conglomerability just go with the
territory of finitely additive functions, so perhaps we need not worry about
them here.5
There is, however, one problem where infinitesimal probabilities seem to
do worse than Popper functions, and it has led some authors to prefer Pop-
per functions. The problem is that infinitesimal probabilities require a field
of hyperreals. But hyperreals are obtained by an argument involving using
the Axiom of Choice from set theory to prove the existence of an ultrafilter
satisfying needed constraints, however without picking out a unique such ul-
trafilter. There are many ultrafilters, yielding different hyperreal extensions
of the reals that can be used to define infinitesimal probabilities, with many
choices of value within an extension (cf. Easwaran 2014). All this allows
for a multiplicity of assignments of extensions of a real-valued measure to
a hyperreal-valued measure that yield, to within an infinitesimal, the same
conditional probabilities for Bayesian epistemology. Since it is the condi-
tional probabilities that have epistemological significance, Easwaran (2014)
has argued that hyperreal-valued probabilities carry more information than
is there in the epistemology.6
let P ∗(A) = (1− α)P (A) + αQ(A). Then P ∗ is a regular measure infinitesimally close to
P .
4Weintraub (2008) observes that Williamson’s symmetries or isomorphism do not pre-
serve a certain a global property. This shortcoming of Williamson’s example is fixed in
Section 3.2 of the present paper.
5See also DiBella (2018) on how the phenomenon of non-conglomerability goes beyond
numerical probabilities.
6Ha´jek (2003 p. 292) made a somewhat weaker claim.
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Even more worryingly, the choice of a hyperreal extension appears to be
not only arbitrary but ineffable (Ha´jek 2003)—we cannot successfully refer
to a particular extension, and so a particular extension cannot reflect our
credences.7
In the next section, I will argue that the ineffability argument does not
apply to all extensions of the reals, and even as restricted to the hyper-
reals it is unsuccessful. But then I will note that there are two levels of
underdetermination, and even if there is no underdetermination at the level
of choice of extension of the reals, I will prove a result showing that there
is underdetermination—but not necessarily ineffability—at the level of the
choice of particular infinitesimals in the extension field, no matter how one
extends the field of reals. Next, I will argue that adding a certain limit
axiom does not solve the uniqueness problem. Finally, I will argue against
three defenses of underdetermination offered by an anonymous reader.
Throughout the paper, I am assuming that we are assigning a single prob-
ability function. An approach in terms of imprecise probabilities, where
a family of hyperreal-valued probability functions is assigned as in Sec-
tion 6.1.2 of Benci, Horsten and Wenmackers (2018), may well be able to
escape the underdetermination worries.8 As such, the paper can also be
considered as adding motivation for an imprecise probability approach.9
2. Specifying an extension
The standard construction of hyperreals makes use of a mathematical
object called a free ultrafilter. An ultrafilter on an algebra F of sets can be
thought of as classifying which members of F count as relevant, subject to
the axioms that the intersection of a pair of relevant sets is relevant; that a
superset of a relevant set is relevant; and that for every set A in F , either
A or its complement is relevant. One trivial way to get an ultrafilter is to
distinguish some element a0 and say that a set is relevant if and only if it
contains a0. A free ultrafilter is any ultrafilter not constructed in this way.
Any free ultrafilter defines a hyperreal extension of the reals.10
The existence of hyperreal extensions thus depends on the existence of free
ultrafilters. The existence of free ultrafilters on any infinite algebra follows
from the Axiom of Choice in set theory, but the proof does not construct
a particular ultrafilter—it just shows that there is at least one. And there
7Easwaran (2014) gives an elegant argument based on supervenience and the Church-
Turing thesis.
8I am grateful to an anonymous reader for observing this.
9But interestingly perhaps not an imprecise probability approach in terms of intervals of
hyperreal probabilities. For the transformation in our Theorem 1 may imply arbitrariness
in some interval-valued hyperreal accounts.
10The hyperreals can be taken to be equivalence classes of F-measurable functions from
I to the reals under the equivalence relation ∼ where f ∼ g if and only if {x ∈ I : f(x) 6=
g(x)} is not relevant. We then identify each real number r with the constant function that
is equal to r everywhere.
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isn’t just one, but infinitely many. Thus, we have an underdetermination of
the particular extension of the reals.
It is popularly thought that where an existence proof depends essentially
on the Axiom of Choice, we cannot uniquely specify a particular one of the
items proved to exist. Moreover, assuming that Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory
is consistent, the proof of the existence of an ultrafilter on an infinite set is
known to essentially use some version of the Axiom of Choice (Pincus and
Solovay 1977). This leads to the thought that we cannot uniquely specify
a hyperreal extension of the reals, and the multiplicity of extensions thus
is an objectionable form of underdetermination, since there is no reason to
take one or another extension as the home of the correct model of an agent’s
credences.
This line of argument, however, has multiple difficulties. First, the pop-
ular thought about the unspecifiability of objects proved to exist with the
Axiom of Choice is known to be mistaken. For instance, say that a set A
is a xyzzy on F if and only if (a) A is non-empty and (b) every member
of A is a free ultrafilter on F . Then there is a xyzzy on F if and only if
there is a free ultrafilter on F . Thus, just as we need the Axiom of Choice
to prove the existence of a free ultrafilter on F , we need it to prove the
existence of a xyzzy on F . But if the Axiom of Choice is true, then set X of
all free ultrafilters on F is non-empty, and hence is a xyzzy—a xyzzy that
we have explicitly specified. Of course, a xyzzy is not an ultrafilter. But
by leveraging the idea that even when it is difficult to specify a particular
ultrafilter, one can specify sets of ultrafilters, Kanovei and Shelah (2004) ex-
plicitly defined a particular free ultrafilter on a particular infinite set. The
proof that their specification succeeds depends on the Axiom of Choice, but
nonetheless the specification is explicit. Furthermore, Kanovei and Shelah
used their construction to make an explicitly specified extension of the reals
(an iteration of the hyperreal extension using this ultrafilter) having further
desirable properties.
Second, one should be satisfied with specifying an isomorphism class of
hyperreals. After all, Bayesian epistemologists who use classical probability
need not be concerned about the fact that there are infinitely many sets
isomorphic to the reals that could just as well be used for values of the
probability function—the Benacerraf (1965) dilemma is a serious problem
in the philosophy of mathematics, but does not seem germane to Bayesian
epistemology. The values of the probability function are already just a model
of credences, and models need only be picked out up to isomorphism. But
it turns out that we can specify a set of hyperreals up to isomorphism.
For some cardinals κ, there is a unique-up-to-isomorphism κ-saturated non-
standard real line of cardinality κ (Keisler 1994, Section 11). And there
might be some non-arbitrary way to choose the cardinal κ, perhaps a way
matching the particular problem under discussion.
Third, hyperreals are not the only way to get infinitesimals. There are
multiple methods that do not make use of anything like the arbitrary choice
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of an ultrafilter. One way is to go for a very large extension of the reals:
John Conway’s surreals. There are so many surreals that they are a proper
class rather than a set, but the class of surreals, as a class, is explicitly
specified. Whatever you can do with hyperreals, you can do with surreals,
since any field of hyperreals can be embedded in the surreals (Ehrlich 2012).
Or one can go a more modest route and go for formal Laurent series
(Laugwitz 1968 and Pedersen MS) or the Levi-Civita field (Shamseddine
and Berz 2010). The field of formal Laurent series is the field of all formal
sums of the form
∑
n∈Z anε
n, where Z is the set of integers, each an is a
real number, only finitely many of the an that have n < 0 are non-zero, and
ε is a formal symbol for an infinitesimal. Similarly, the Levi-Civita field is
the field of all formal sums of the form
∑
q∈Q aqε
q, where Q is the rationals,
each aq is a real number, only finitely many of the aq are non-zero, and ε
is a formal symbol for an infinitesimal. These fields are explicitly specified.
Here, one does not worry about the meaning of ε, since the members of the
fields can just be identified with sequences (an) or (aq).
Now, admittedly, even if one can specify particular fields containing in-
finitesimals, there is still the problem of choosing among the rival specified
constructions. But here there might be some hope. The surreals have the
advantage of being exhaustively large, large enough that they escape the car-
dinality arguments against regularity of Pruss (2013a). The fields of formal
Laurent series and the Levi-Civita field, on the other hand, have the ad-
vantage of being elegantly small. (On the other hand, the Kanovei-Shelah
field, while mathematically fascinating, probably has little going for it in
this context.) So the friend of infinitesimal probabilities has a real hope of
non-arbitrarily specifying a particular field of infinitesimals.
3. Choice of particular infinitesimals
3.1. Ineffability. But while at the level of the choice of an extension of
reals that includes infinitesimals we can escape the arbitrariness objection,
there is a lower level where arbitrariness enters in: the choice of particular
infinitesimals within the extension to be particular values of the probabil-
ity function. There are two ways one can raise a concern about this. The
stronger way is an ineffability worry. Even if we can refer to a particular
extension of the reals, perhaps we cannot refer to a particular infinitesimal
member of that extension. The weaker is an underdetermination worry:
there is no rational reason to choose a particular infinitesimal member of an
extension to be a value for the probability of the function. In the remain-
der of this subsection I will argue that the ineffability worry has not been
successfully established, but in the rest of the paper I will argue that the
underdetermination worry is very real.
First, note that if we choose formal Laurent series or the Levi-Civita field,
there is no ineffability worry at all. In both cases, ε (say) is a completely
specified infinitesimal.
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Second, if we insist on the richer mathematical structure of the hyper-
reals, things become more murky. Go¨del proved that if Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory is consistent, then it is also consistent with the Axiom of Con-
structibility V = L. A consequence of the Axiom of Constructibility is that
the language of set theory can be used to explicitly define a well-ordering
≺ on all sets (Jech, 1997, p. 108). But given this well-ordering, we can de-
fine hyperreal extensions and particular infinitesimal members of them with
great ease. For instance, start with the power set PN of the naturals N. By
the Axiom of Choice, there is a non-empty set U of ultrafilters on PN. But
any non-empty well-ordered set has a unique least element, so there is a ≺-
least element U0 of U , where ≺ is our definable well-ordering on the universe
of sets. We can then define a hyperreal extension RU0 with respect to the
ultrafilter U0, and then let α be the ≺-least positive infinitesimal in RU0 .
We have now specified an extension of the hyperreals, RU0 , and a particular
positive infinitesimal in that extension, α. There is no ineffability.
Now, the Axiom of Constructibility may well be false. But it may also
be true. If it is true, then even if one insists on hyperreal infinitesimals,
ineffability is false: we can refer to a particular infinitesimal. And even if the
Axiom of Constructibility is false, it might still be the case that some weaker
version of it is sufficient to imply the existence of a definable hyperreal
infinitesimal is true. Or at least no argument to the contrary has been
offered.
3.2. Intuitions. Prior to giving a theorem embodying a precise underde-
termination claim, I will offer some intuitive reasons to think that there is
underdetermination.
Fix an extension R∗ of the reals, and suppose Alice assigns an infinitesi-
mal α in R∗ to the hypothesis that a fair coin flipped countably often always
landed heads, while Bob assigns 2α to that hypothesis. Both assign con-
sistent finitely additive probabilities. On what grounds could we say that
Alice’s assignment of α rather than 2α was rationally right—or even better
reflective of Alice’s doxastic state?
Here is perhaps a more vivid way to see the point. Suppose a fair coin is
tossed every day from eternity to eternity. Number the days with integers n,
let Hn be the hypothesis that starting with day n, it’s all heads for the rest
of time, and write p(n) = P (Hn). Then p(n) = (1/2)p(n+ 1): to get Hn we
need to have heads on day n as well as to have Hn+1, while the toss on day
n is independent of Hn+1. It follows that more generally p(n) = 2
n−mp(m)
for any integers n and m, and hence that if any one of the p(n) is non-
zero, they are all non-zero, and yet they are all different.11 (Note that the
present example gets around a problem with Williamson’s example noted
11Williamson (2007) uses this to argue against infinitesimal probabilities, since by
symmetry considerations he considers it absurd that the P (Hn) be all different. But the
friend of infinitesimal probabilities rejects this reasoning (see Hofweber 2014, though that
paper does concern chances rather than epistemic probabilities).
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by Weintraub 2008.) But now let n be the number corresponding to the
day you were born. Then p(n) is some infinitesimal α. But why is that
particular infinitesimal α assigned to the day you were born rather than,
say, to the day Napoleon died? There seems to be no reason to assign α to
that day rather than to some other day.
Other problems of choosing infinitesimals arise for uniform distributions.
For while in classical probability, once we say that a distribution is uniform,
that tends to fix the probability, while this is not the case when we allow
infinitesimal probabilities. Consider a spinner designed to stop uniformly at
some angle θ1 from 0
◦ (inclusive) to 360◦ (exclusive). Now consider a second
spinner which functions in exactly the same way, except that once it stops,
we double its angle. Thus, if it stops at 15◦, we move it to 30◦, and if it
stops at 350◦, we double the angle to 700◦, which is equivalent to 340◦. Call
the initial angle of the second spinner θ21 and the final doubled angle θ22.
Observe that θ22 is just as uniformly distributed over all the angles as θ21
is, and that θ21 has the same distribution as θ1. Let α = P (θ1 = 0
◦). By
uniformity we also have P (θ1 = 180
◦) = α, and because the two spinners
initially function the same way, P (θ21 = 0
◦) = P (θ21 = 180◦) = α. But
θ22 = 0
◦ if and only if either θ21 = 0◦ or θ21 = 180◦. Thus, P (θ22 = 0◦) = 2α.
And by uniformity 2α is the probability of every outcome for θ22. Hence
two uniform processes with the same outcome space—angles from 0◦ to
360◦—would have different infinitesimal probabilities for singletons.
This means that we cannot simply specify an infinitesimal by saying that
it is whatever is the probability of a uniform process hitting a particular
point. For what that probability is—assuming it is infinitesimal and not
zero—depends on details of the process that go beyond uniformity. And we
have no idea how that dependence would go, and little reason to think there
is a fact of the matter.
3.3. Some constraints. Still there are potential types of constraints on the
choice of infinitesimals that may help narrow down the choice of infinitesimal
probabilities.
One obvious constraint is formal: the axioms of finitely additive proba-
bility.
A second type of constraint is match between the extended real probabil-
ities for a problem and the corresponding classical real-valued probabilities.
This match, of course, cannot be equality, because we are after all trying to
make events whose probability is classically zero have non-zero probability.
But we can require the following ordinal-match constraint: if the classical
probability of A is strictly less than the classical probability of B, then the
extended real probability of A is strictly less than that of B. We can also
require a formally stronger match condition, that if the classical probability
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is x and the extended real probability is x′, then x and x′ differ at most by
an infinitesimal.12
One way to get the classical real-valued probabilities for applying the
second constraint is to make use of the agent’s rational preferences and a
classical representation theorem. But for particular problems there may be
other ways to get to appropriate classical probabilities, such as a uniform
probability distribution over a target for a random dart throwing case, or an
infinite product of probabilities for an infinite sequence of coin tosses. And
there might be some direct access to agent’s credences based on their own
probabilistic claims.
A third constraint consists in symmetry conditions. For instance, in
the case of a symmetric spinner selecting an angle from 0 to 360 degrees,
we would like to insist on rotational symmetry. Unfortunately, we know
that there are limits on how much symmetry can be imposed in a con-
text with infinitesimals. In the spinner case, for instance, let r be any
irrational number, and consider the sets of angles A1 = {r, 2r, 3r, . . . } and
A2 = {2r, 3r, . . . } in degrees (with angles wrapping around, so that 361◦ is
the same as 1◦). If each singleton has non-zero probability, then by additiv-
ity P (A1) = P (A2) + P ({r}) > P (A2). But the set A2 is just a rotation of
A1 by r degrees. Thus there is no way to assign rotation-symmetric proba-
bilities here with non-zero probability being assigned to each singleton (cf.
Pruss 2013a). Thus symmetry conditions often need to be approximate, i.e.,
probabilities being preserved under symmetries modulo infinitesimal differ-
ences.
Finally, we may wish to require that not only are the above kinds of con-
straints satisfied by unconditional probabilities, but also by conditional prob-
abilities defined by the ratio formula. Thus, we may make use of the agent’s
hypothetical or conditional rational preferences to try to tease out real-
valued conditional probabilities that our ratio-defined probabilities should
approximately match.
3.4. The underdetermination theorem. Unfortunately, no constraints
like the above are sufficient to determine infinitesimal probabilities. It turns
out that if we have any extended real probability that satisfies constraints
like the above, one can construct a different extended real probability that
does so as well.
The construction is pretty simple. Given a totally ordered field extension
R∗ of the reals and an x ∈ R∗, if x is finite (i.e., −y < x < y for some real
y), we can uniquely express x as x1 +x2 where x1 is a real number and x2 is
infinitesimal. Denote the standard and infinitesimal parts of x as Stdx = x1
and Inf x = x2 (we will prove the existence of these parts in the Appendix).
12The ordinal-match constraint follows from this, because if x and y are real numbers
such that x < y, and x ≈ x′ and y ≈ y′, then x′ < y′, since the distance between two
distinct real numbers must be more than infinitesimal.
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Now, suppose P is our favorite R∗-valued probability assignment. For
any positive real α, define Pα(A) = StdP (A) + α Inf P (A). Observe that
if α 6= 1, then Pα(A) is different from P (A) whenever P (A) is not a real
number. Thus, if P ever takes on a non-real value, Pα and P are different.
But they are also very similar in respect of our constraints. First, note
that P (A) and Pα(A) differ by at most an infinitesimal (namely by (1 −
α) Inf P (A)). Furthermore:
Theorem 1. If P is an R∗-valued probability function and α > 0 is real,
then:
(i) Pα is an R∗-valued probability function,
(ii) P (A) < P (B) if and only if Pα(A) < Pα(B),
(iii) if P (C) > 0, then P (A | C) < P (B | C) if and only if Pα(A | C) <
Pα(B | C)
(iv) if a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm are real, then for any events A1, . . . , An, B1, . . . , Bm
we have
∑
i aiP (Ai) <
∑




(v) if P (C) > 0, and a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm are real, then for any events
A1, . . . , An, B1, . . . , Bm we have
∑
i aiP (Ai | C) <
∑
i biP (Bi | C) if
and only if
∑
i aiPα(Ai | C) <
∑
i biPα(Bi | C)
(vi) if P (C) > 0, then P (A | C) ≈ Pα(A | C).
By (i), the formal probabilistic constraints are satisfied by Pα.
By (ii), any ordinal constraints that P satisfies will also be satisfied by
Pα. Moreover, it follows from (ii) that P (A) = P (B) if and only if Pα(A) =
Pα(B). Thus, any symmetry conditions exactly satisfied by P will be exactly
satisfied by Pα. Moreover, since P and Pα are always infinitesimally close,
any symmetry conditions satisfied by P modulo infinitesimal differences will
also be satisfied by Pα modulo infinitesimal differences.
Next, observe that (iv) guarantees that P and Pα yield the same decision-
theoretic comparisons between finite gambling portfolios with real-valued
utilities, since they yield the same comparisons between expected utilities.
Moreover, (iii) and (v), respectively, show that the equivalences in (ii)
and (iv) remain true even if we conditionalize on some event with non-zero
R∗-valued probability. Furthermore, (iii) shows that P (A | C) = P (B | C)
if and only if Pα(A | C) = Pα(B | C), which shows that any symmetry
constraints that P exactly satisfies conditionally on some subset C will also
be satisfied in the same way by Pα.
Finally, (vi) implies that P and Pα generate the same Popper conditional
probability function, and that conditional or unconditional symmetry con-
straints satisfied by P modulo infinitesimal differences are also satisfied by
Pα modulo infinitesimal differences.
The proof will be given in the appendix.
Thus the kinds of constraints that we have discussed in the case of P will
also be satisfied by an uncountable infinity of other measures taking values
in the extended-real field.
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3.5. Other putative constraints. One might, however, hope that there
are some further constraints one can put on P that will determine it more
finely.
We saw that P and Pα yield the same decisions between finite gambling
portfolios with real-valued utilities. But what about infinite gambling port-
folios or utilities that are not real-valued?
The case of infinite gambling portfolios is difficult to handle for probabil-
ities taking their value in an extension of the reals. A field extension of the
reals is guaranteed to have sensible finite sums, but there is in general no
well-defined notion of a sum of an infinite sequence of values in an extension
R∗ of R. Hence, if we insist on handling infinite gambling portfolios, we run
into technical problems independent of the underdetermination objection.
However, non-real-valued utilities in a finite portfolio could in principle
still impose decision-theoretic constraints on probabilities that would distin-
guish between Pα and P . For instance, suppose that an agent is indifferent
between (a) getting one unit of utility with certainty and (b) getting N
units of utility, where N is some positive infinite member of R∗, if a ran-
domly thrown dart lands in the center of the target. Then one can attribute
to the agent an infinitesimal credence of 1/N that the dart will land there.
However, it is difficult to see how one would go about assigning a par-
ticular infinite value in R∗ for a particular infinitely valuable scenario. It is
difficult, indeed, to imagine infinitely valuable scenarios, and to assign par-
ticular values—say, N rather than N + 3.4—to them seems to be entirely
arbitrary.
About the only way we can imagine a particular infinitely valuable sce-
nario seems to be the countably infinite repetition of a finitely valuable
scenario.13 Perhaps we can imagine eating a particular donut every day for
eternity, without ever getting tired of it, and then we might assign to the
eternal donut deal a utility equal to the number of days in eternity times
the utility of a single donut consumption. But to do that, we would need to
assign an infinite quantity, M , in R∗ equal to the number of days in eter-
nity. This, however, faces a surprising technical difficulty. Counts have to
be something like natural numbers. We might call them “hypernaturals”
when we allow for infinities. But it turns out that for any positive infinite
number M in R∗, if R∗ has a collection of hypernaturals, then there will
be uncountably many (in external cardinality) hypernaturals between 1 and
M (Pruss 2014, Appendix). And so the countable number of future days
that we’ve imagined is not what is counted by M : instead, M counts the
number of members of the uncountable set {1, 2, . . . ,M} of hypernaturals.
The countable number of future days does not have a hypernatural in R∗
that we can assign, and so in the case of the only infinitely valuable scenario
that we can imagine, we cannot assign an appropriate hyperreal value.
13Some religions, of course, do claim that union with God is infinitely valuable, even
over a short period of time. But religions that hold this are apt to also say that this union
is unimaginable to us.
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Alternately, we might imagine that an agent has credences that are de-
rived from bets that involve infinitesimal differences in utilities. Thus, if
I rationally price a bet on A and a bet on not-A equally, but my utility
for A is 10 and my utility for B is 10 + α for an infinitesimal α, then my
probabilities for A and not-A must respectively be (10 + α)/(20 + α) and
10/(20 + α). But again it seems that the choice of the particular infinites-
imal α is unconstrained by any realistic rational psychology. Granted, one
might reasonably wish to model the fact that the agent slightly, maybe even
infinitesimally, prefers B over A. But there seems to be no reason to assign
one particular infinitesimal difference in utility rather than another.
3.6. The Ω-limit axiom. Benci, Horsten and Wenmackers (2018) propose
an additional axiom for probability functions taking their values in an ex-
tension of the reals. According to Hofweber (2014), this axiom is meant to
capture the intuition that global probabilities are determined by the prob-
abilities of individual events, in a way that provides a replacement for the
countable additivity axiom of classical probability theory (Hofweber is talk-
ing of chances, but one may think something similar should apply to epis-
temic probabilities). The alternate probability function Pα in our underde-
termination theorem probability has not been shown to satisfy the Ω-limit
axiom.14
I shall argue that (a) there is a weakening of the axiom that captures the
intuition about the determination of global probabilities by individual prob-
abilities to no lesser degree than the original axiom, but the weakened axiom
is preserved by the move from P to Pα and (b) there is an underdetermina-
tion theorem for the special and unique-up-to-isomorphism extension of the
reals considered by Benci, Horsten and Wenmackers’ (2013) that preserves
the full Ω-limit axiom.
Consider our probability space Ω and suppose that our probability func-
tion P is defined for all subsets of Ω. Let Λ be the collection of all the finite
non-empty15 subsets of Ω. Consider the set RΛ of all functions from Λ to R.
Then an Ω-limit is a function L : RΛ → R∗ (where R∗ is the extended real
field that P takes its values in) such that:
(i) L(f + g) = L(f) + L(g)
(ii) L(f · g) = L(f) · L(g)
(iii) L(f) = c if f is eventually equal to c in the sense that there is a
λ0 ∈ Λ such that if λ ⊇ λ0, then f(λ) = c,
where f + g and f · g are the pointwise sum and product of the functions f
and g. The Ω-limit axiom then says that our probability function P is such
that:
(a) P (A | λ) is a real number for all λ ∈ Λ, and
14I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out the relevance of the axiom to
the project of this paper.
15Benci, Horsten and Wenmackers (2018) allow for empty subsets, but it simplifies the
definitions not to do so, without making any substantive difference.
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(b) there exists an Ω-limit L such that P (A) = L(P (A | ·)) for all A ⊆ Ω,
where P (A | ·) is the function in RΛ whose value at λ ∈ Λ is P (A | λ).
Notice that the Ω-limit axiom ensures a way for the probabilities of arbi-
trary subsets of Ω to depend on the probabilities of finite subsets of Ω, since
P (A | λ) = P (A∩ λ)/P (λ) and both A∩ λ and λ are finite if λ ∈ Λ. Indeed
it makes the probabilities of arbitrary subsets depend on the probabilities
of individual events, since if λ = {α1, . . . , αn} is a finite subset with the αi
distinct, then P (λ) = P ({α1}) + · · · + P ({αn}) by finite additivity. This
is somewhat similar to the way that in a classical countably infinite prob-
ability space Ω, for any enumeration α1, α2, . . . of Ω, the probability of an
arbitrary subset A is equal to limn→∞ P (A∩Ωn) where Ωn = {α1, . . . , αn},
and P (A ∩Ωn) is determined by the probabilities of individual events since
P (A ∩ Ωn) = P ({β1}) + · · · + P ({βk}) where A ∩ Ωn = {β1, . . . , βk} for
distinct βi.
16
Note that a consequence of (i)–(iii) is that if f ≥ g pointwise (i.e., f(λ) ≥
g(λ) for all λ ∈ Λ), then L(f) ≥ L(g). For let h(λ) = √f(λ)− h(λ) so that
f − g = h · h. Let n(λ) = −1 for all λ ∈ Λ and observe that by (iii) we have
L(n) = −1. Then by (i) and (ii):
L(f)− L(g) = L(f) + L(n)L(g)
= L(f) + L(n · g)
= L(f + n · g)
= L(f − g)
= L(h · h)
= (L(h))2 ≥ 0,
so L(f) ≥ L(g). This gives us an order-preservation property we intuitively
want in our Ω-limit axiom, in that we want to make sure that if P (A | λ) ≥
P (B | λ) for all λ ∈ Λ, then P (A) ≥ P (B).
Let us now say that a weak Ω-limit is a function L : RΛ → R∗ that
satisfies (i), (iii) and:
(ii∗) If f ≥ g pointwise, then L(f) ≥ L(g).
And say that P satisfies the weak Ω-limit axiom provided that in the state-
ment of the Ω-limit axiom condition (a) above holds and that (b) holds
with “Ω-limit” replaced by “weak Ω-limit”. The weak Ω-limit axiom makes
probabilities of arbitrary subsets be determined by the probabilities of finite
subsets just as much as the original Ω-limit axiom did: in both cases there
16It is however worth noting a difference between the Ω-limit axiom and the limit
condition that classical countably infinite probability spaces satisfy. In the classical case,
the limit operation limn→∞ is defined independently of P , and the limit condition holds
for any enumeration α1, α2, . . . of Ω. But in the Ω-limit axiom, it is only claimed that
the limit function L exists for any given P : different probability functions P may have
different limit functions L that witness to their satisfaction of the Ω-limit axiom. To me,
this seems to make the Ω-limit axiom not very satisfying.
14 ALEXANDER R. PRUSS
is a function that takes us from the values of P (A | λ) for λ ∈ Λ to the value
of P (A). In the weak case, the function may lack the nice property (ii),
though it has the weaker replacement (ii∗). Recall that according to Hofwe-
ber (2014), we needed the Ω-limit axiom to ensure the determination of
probabilities of arbitrary subsets by probabilities of individual events. The
weak Ω-limit axiom yields such a determination, too. It lacks the nice mul-
tiplicative property (ii), but it is still a determination of global probabilities
by probabilities of individual events.
And now note that in the setting of our Theorem 1, if P satisfies the weak
Ω-limit axiom (but not necessarily the Ω-limit axiom), then Pα satisfies the
weak Ω-limit axiom. To see this, let φα(x) = Stdx+ α Inf x for x ∈ R∗ and
α ∈ R. Let Lα(f) = φα(L(f)). That Lα satisfies (i), (ii∗) and (iii) follows
immediately from these two lemmas that are proved in the Appendix.
Lemma 1. The function φα is R-linear: φα(αx + βy) = αφα(x) + βφα(y)
for all α and β in R and x and y in R∗.
Lemma 2. The function φα is strictly increasing: if x < y are in R∗, then
φα(x) < φα(y).
Note that P (A | λ) = P (A ∩ λ)/P (λ) is the ratio of two real numbers
by condition (a) in the Ω-limit axiom (which holds unchanged in the weak
axiom). Since P (B) = Pα(B) whenever P (B) is real (as Inf P (B) is zero
then), it follows that P (A | λ) = Pα(A | λ). For the same reason, Pα satisfies
condition (a) of the axiom. Then by the weak Ω-limit axiom:
Lα(Pα(A | ·)) = Lα(P (A | ·)) = φα(L(P (A | ·))) = φα(P (A)) = Pα(A),
and so Pα satisfies both conditions in the axiom.
Next, observe that Benci, Horsten and Wenmackers’ (2013, Section 4.2)
initial constructions of spaces satisfying the full Ω-limit axiom have not been
shown to involve a unique extension of the real numbers, as they depend on
an arbitrary choice of a fine ideal. Thus, these constructions do not provide
a solution to the first underdetermination problem, the one concerning the
choice of the extended real field. Benci, Horsten and Wenmackers (2013)
do, however, suggest that one could work with a κ-saturated17 hyperreal
line of cardinality κ for a certain large cardinal κ (Section 4.5), which as
noted earlier is unique up to isomorphism (Keisler 1994, Section 11), and
which they say would be sufficient for any case “one may wish to consider in
applied mathematics”. Unfortunately, if one moves to such a field, the sec-
ond underdetermination problem—the choice of specific non-standard real
probabilities—returns. The following is well-known to those in the field, but
I have not been able to find an explicit proof in the literature, so a proof is
sketched in the Appendix:
Proposition 1. Suppose R∗ is a κ-saturated hyperreal line with cardinality
κ and suppose that κ > ‖R‖. Then for any z ∈ R∗ − R, there is a field
17See Sacks (2011).
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isomorphism φ of R∗ onto itself such that φ(x) = x for all real x and φ(z) 6=
z.
But then we have this (also proved in the Appendix):
Theorem 2. Suppose R∗ is a hyperreal line and let P be an R∗-valued prob-
ability function satisfying the Ω-limit axiom. Let φ be a field isomorphism
of R∗ onto itself such that φ(x) = x for all real x. Let Pφ(A) = φ(P (A)).
Then Pφ is an R∗-valued probability function satisfying the Ω-limit axiom
and conditions (i)–(vi) of Theorem 1 hold with Pφ in place of Pα.
Thus, if P (A) is a non-standard real z, we can choose φ such that φ(z) 6= z,
and then Pφ will differ from P at least at A, but will nonetheless satisfy all
the same axioms, including the Ω-limit axiom, and will satisfy the conditions
(i)–(vi) of Theorem 1.
Hence, in the one case Benci, Horsten and Wenmackers (2013) consider
where the extended field is uniquely determined, the choice of probabilities
is not uniquely determined, even given the strong Ω-limit axiom.
4. Three defenses of underdetermination
An anonymous reader has offered three arguments that the kind of un-
derdetermination that I identify might be quite innocent.
4.1. Colors and mathematical constructions. Models have semanti-
cally irrelevant features. The reader offered the example a subway map
that could indicate the same route with different colors. Perhaps even more
tellingly, a mathematical model of some aspect of reality could use any of a
host of different set-theoretic constructions of numbers—the natural number
2 could be identified with the set {∅, {∅}}, or the set {{∅}}, etc.18—without
this making any difference to how well the model represents what is being
modeled. Indeed, in this way, even classical real-valued probabilities are sub-
ject to underdetermination, as it is underdetermined which of the equivalent
constructions of real numbers (say, Dedekind cuts, lower parts of Dedekind
cuts, upper parts of Dedekind cuts, equivalence classes of Cauchy sequences,
infinitely long decimals, infinitely long binary numbers, etc., which in turn
can be layered on different constructions of natural numbers, sequences,
etc.) is to be used for the values of the probabilities. The typical scientist
does not care about such questions: as long as the maps or constructions
are isomorphic, the specific choice makes no difference.
The arbitrariness argument in Theorem 1 seems to be more of the same.
We have a bijection φα(x) = Stdx + α Inf x of the non-standard reals be-
tween 0 and 1 onto themselves, which bijection can be composed with one
assignment P of probabilities to obtain another assignment Pα. The bijec-
tion itself is a kind of isomorphism: it preserves sums, multiplication by
real numbers and order, as we saw in Lemmas 1 and 2. What difference is
18Cf. Benacerraf 1965
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there between this and the recoloring isomorphism of subway maps or the
isomorphism between different equivalent constructions of the reals?
Here is one difference. In the sciences, we do not compare real numbers
from different constructions, nor do we in practical life choose a subway
route on the basis of the color of the map when that color is semantically
insignificant.19 But it could make important sense to compare different
probability functions in situations where infinitesimals are introduced. For
instance, a common use for infinitesimals is modeling countably infinite fair
lotteries.20 Consider, then, a choice which of two lotteries to play. The prize
is the same in each. The lottery is only run if you choose to play it. In each
case, you will get a single ticket with the same fixed positive integer, let’s
say seven. The mechanism for the lotteries works as follows. In the first
lottery, there is an infinite urn containing balls numbered 1, 2, 3, . . . from
which somehow one ball is uniformly chosen, and the winning ticket is the
one whose number equals the number printed on the ball. The second lottery
involves an exactly similar urn, but the winning ticket number is given by
taking the number printed on the ball, dividing by two and rounding up
(e.g., if ball 13 comes up, then the winner is given by rounding 6.5 up to 7).
If we keep to classical real-valued probabilities, we will say that in each case
the chance of winning is zero, so it doesn’t matter which lottery you play.
But intuitively the second lottery is better, since in the first lottery you win
if the ball numbered 7 comes out of the urn, while in the second you win
if either 13 or 14 comes out of the urn. Thus intuitively you have a double
chance of winning in the second lottery, and hence it’s a better choice.
Each lottery’s winning number is governed by its own probability distribu-
tion. Let’s say that the two probability distributions are P (1) and P (2). The
difference between P (1)({7}) and P (2)({7}) (given that you’ve been told you
will get ticket number seven) really matters. But if there is no semantically
significant difference between a probability distribution P and the modified
distribution Pα, then the difference between P
(1)
α ({7}) and P (1)({7}) won’t
matter. But take α = 2. Since φ2 doubles infinitesimal arguments, we then
have P
(1)
2 ({7}) = 2P (1)({7}), which in turn is intuitively equal to P (2)({7}).
Hence, if the difference between P
(1)
α ({7}) and P (1)({7}) does not matter,
neither does the difference between P (2)({7}) and P (1)({7}). But that dif-
ference does actually matter to decision theory: we want to play the lottery
where the chance of winning is bigger.
19Of course, it need not be insignificant. Express routes, for instance, could be marked
in red.
20Admittedly, there are serious issues in how to make an infinite lottery work (see
Norton 2017, Norton and Pruss 2017 and Pruss 2018). But here I am simply using
the lotteries as an intuition pump about the importance of assignments of particular
infintesimals.
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The lesson from the lottery case is that it is not only the comparisons
between values of the same probability function that matter, but also com-
parisons between values of different probability functions that matter, and
hence the transformation φα does actually make a difference. The case where
different constructions of real numbers are used for probability assignments
or different colors are used by different maps is disanalogous, for there is
a natural and non-arbitrary way to translate between the constructions or
colors.21
Moreover, if it turns out that the exact values of the infinitesimals are
insignificant artifacts of a hyperreal model of probabilities, we have good
reason to prefer a model that lacks such artifacts, such as a Popper function
or a comparative (or “qualitative”) probability model. Or at least propo-
nents of hyperreal models owe us a defense of an account of exactly which
features of the model correspond to reality (for instance, in a model that uses
real numbers, we might reasonably say that the features of the model that
correspond to reality are those that are preserved by field isomorphism).
4.2. Benacerraf. The Thomson’s Lamp paradox supposes a lamp that
starts (say) off, but its switch is toggled infinitely often during a finite in-
terval of time. The paradox is supposed to be that we have no good answer
to the question of whether after the interval of time the lamp is on or off
(Thomson 1954). Benacerraf (1962) argues that there is no real paradox,
but simply an insufficiency of information. The setup tells us what happens
after a finite number of switch togglings, but says nothing about what hap-
pens after an infinite number. Both the answer that the lamp is on and that
the lamp is off at the end of the interval are logically compatible with the
story, but to know which answer is true, we would need more information,
say about some law of nature specifying what happens in infinite switch-
ing situations. This is a plausible response to the paradox.22 By analogy,
one might think that more information is needed about a particular infinite
probabilistic setup to determine the specific infinitesimal probabilities, but
that this is not a problem.
This response, however, is not plausible in cases where the infinite prob-
abilistic setup is generated by an infinite number of independent classical
setups, as in the case of the doubly infinite sequence of coin tosses. We
would expect the chancy character of the system to be determined by the
classical probabilities of each of the individual setups together with a state-
ment that the setups are independent. There is nothing more to be said
about the chanciness of the nth coin toss Xn than the classical statement
21For any two constructions of the real numbers, there is only one isomorphism between
them that preserves the arithmetical operations. This follows from the fact that the only
field automorphism of the reals is the identity (Robert 2000, p. 54).
22Though Pruss (2018) has recently argued that this response may not be fully
satisfactory.
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P (Xn = H) = P (Xn = T ) = 1/2 together with the classical axioms of prob-
ability, and there seems to be nothing more to be said about how these coin
tosses are combined than that they are causally23 independent.24 Genuine
causal independence seems to be the whole story about the connection of
the events.
To make the point vivid, imagine a multiverse consisting of a countable
infinity of causally isolated island universes (except perhaps for an initial
universe-generation process or creator, if things cannot come into existence
ex nihilo), numbered ...,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, ..., in each of which one of the coin
tosses occurs, and nothing else relevant happens. The chances in such a
multiverse should supervene on the fact of causal isolation as well as the
chances in each universe of the multiverse. It seems absurd to suppose there
could be two physically exact duplicates of such a multiverse, with the same
chances within each island universe, but with different global infinitesimal
probabilities.
4.3. Priors. Standard subjective Bayesianism holds that our credences should
be driven by the evidence and the priors, but there are no rational constraints
on priors other than regularity, the requirement that no contingent proposi-
tion get a prior of 0 or 1. As a result, while the dynamics of our credences in
response to evidence may be rationally determined by the evidence, the ac-
tual values of our credences are rationally underdetermined as they depend
on the priors, which are arbitrary. If we accept this, why can’t infinitesimal
probabilities involve a similar arbitrariness?
But, first, even if we accept subjective Bayesianism, that will only help
with the arbitrariness of credences and not with the arbitrariness of ob-
jective chances. Second, there is good reason not to make Bayesianism be
entirely subjective, but to place constraints on the credences. One plausi-
ble constraint would be some version of David Lewis’s Principal Principle,
that (roughly speaking) credences should match chances when the chances
are known. But if the arbitrariness concern forces us to abandon infinitesi-
mal values for chances, then the Principal Principle will force us to likewise
abandon them for those credences that need to match these chances.
5. Conclusions
There might turn out to be some defensible specific choice for an extension
of the real numbers that includes infinitesimals for measuring probabilities.
But even if there is, the choice of which particular infinitesimals in this
extension to assign to which probabilistic situations is highly underdeter-
mined. We can see the underdetermination in two ways. First, we have
considerations connected to particular infinitary processes, such as repeated
coin tosses, where the infinitesimal needs to appropriately co-vary with the
23And not merely statistically according to the classic definition (for limitations of the
latter, see Fitelson and Ha´jek 2017).
24I am grateful to Alan Ha´jek for a sketch of this response.
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event under consideration, but there is no reason to attach a particular in-
finitesimal to a particular event. Second, we have seen that any assignment
of infinitesimal probabilities can be replaced by a different assignment that
matches the same real-valued conditional and unconditional probabilities
and that satisfies all the same plausible decision-theoretic constraints.
Thus using a single hyperreal-valued unconditional probability function
to define conditional probabilities, as opposed to either simply taking the
conditional probabilities to be primitive as in the Popper function approach
or considering a family of hyperreal-valued functions satisfying some con-
straints, introduces degrees of freedom in the choice that do not seem to
match up with anything in reality, and there is good reason to balk at such
an introduction.25
Appendix
Let us start by reviewing some standard facts about extended reals and
their standard and infinitesimal parts.
Suppose that R∗ is an extension of the reals. Say that elements of R∗ are
infinitesimally close provided that their difference is zero or infinitesimal.
Note that the only way two real numbers can be infinitesimally close is if
they are equal. For the difference between two reals is real, and hence can’t
be infinitesimal.
Now suppose x ∈ R∗ is finite, i.e., −y < x < y for some real y. There can
be at most one real number infinitesimally close to x. For suppose there were
two. Then they would also be infinitesimally close to each other (the sum
of two infinitesimals is infinitesimal). But as we just saw, that’s impossible
for two reals.
But there is at least one real number infinitesimally close to x. For let
S = {z ∈ R : z < x}. Then S is a non-empty set, as −y ∈ S (we assumed
−y < x < y for a real y), and it’s bounded above because z < y for every
z ∈ S. Every non-empty set of reals that is bounded above has a supremum,
i.e., a least upper bound (this is a defining property of the reals). Let x1 be
the supremum of S. I now claim that x2 = x − x1 is infinitesimal or zero.
If x1 = x, this is trivial. So suppose x1 6= x. There are two possibilities.
Either x1 < x or x < x1. Suppose first that x1 < x. If x − x1 is not
infinitesimal, there must be a real number a > 0 such that a ≤ x−x1. Then
x1 +a ≤ x, and so x1 < x1 +a/2 < x. Hence, x1 +a/2 ∈ S, and so x1 is not
an upper bound for S, contrary to the assumption that x1 is the supremum
of S. Hence, x − x1 = x2 has to be infinitesimal. The other possibility is
that x < x1. If x1 − x is not infinitesimal, there must be a real number
a > 0 such that a ≤ x1 − x. Then x ≤ x1 − a, so x < x1 − a/2 < x1. But
then x1 − a/2 is an upper bound for S and yet is less than x1, so x1 is not
25The author is grateful to Alan Ha´jek as well as to two anonymous readers for a
number of comments that have greatly improved this paper.
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the least upper bound for S, contrary to x1’s being the supremum of S. So,
x1 − x must be infinitesimal, and hence x2 = −(x1 − x) is infinitesimal.
Thus, x1 is infinitesimally close to x, and so for every finite extended real
x there is a unique real, which we will denote by Stdx, infinitesimally close
to it. This is called the standard part of x. Let Inf x = x − Stdx be the
infinitesimal part of x, so x = Stdx+ Inf x.
Let φα(x) = Stdx + α Inf x. We can now prove the lemmas from Sec-
tion 3.6, which will be useful for proving Theorem 1. First, Lemma 1 follows
immediately from:
Lemma 3. Std and Inf are R-linear functions.
Proof of Lemma 3. If x1 and x are infinitesimally close to each other and if
y1 and y are infinitesimally close to each other, then ax1 + by1 is infinites-
imally close to ax + by, if a and b are real, since ax + by − (ax1 + by1) =
a · (x − x1) + b · (y − y1) and if x − x1 and y − y1 are infinitesimal, their
product with a real number is still infinitesimal, and the sum of two in-
finitesimals is infinitesimal. Hence, if x1 = Stdx and y1 = Std y, it follows
that Std(ax + by) = a Stdx + bStd y. Hence, Std is an R-linear function.
But Inf x = x− Stdx, so if Std is R-linear, so is Inf. 
Second, we prove the strictly increasing character of φα.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose x < y are in R∗. By linearity φα(y)− φα(x) =
φα(y − x). Letting z = y − x, all we need to show is that if z > 0 is finite,
then φα(z) > φα(0) = 0. To show this, suppose first that z is infinitesimal.
Then Std z = 0 and Inf z = z, so φα(z) = αz > 0. Suppose now that z is
not infinitesimal. Then Std z is a positive real, but α Inf z is infinitesimal.
Adding an infinitesimal to a positive real has to result in something positive,
so φα(z) = Std z + α Inf z > 0. 
Note also that φα fixes the reals, i.e., φα(x) = x for any real x, as then
Inf x = 0. Finally, observe that φ1/α(φα(x)) = x, so φ is a bijection.
Lemma 4. Suppose P is an R∗-valued probability function, and φ : R∗ → R∗
is an R-linear and strictly increasing bijection fixing the reals. Let Pφ(A) =
φ(P (A)). Then:
(i) Pφ is an R∗-valued probability function,
(ii) P (A) < P (B) if and only if Pφ(A) < Pφ(B),
(iii) if P (C) > 0, then P (A | C) < P (B | C) if and only if Pφ(A | C) <
Pφ(B | C)
(iv) if a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm are real, then for any events A1, . . . , An, B1, . . . , Bm
we have
∑
i aiP (Ai) <
∑




(v) if P (C) > 0, and a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm are real, then for any events
A1, . . . , An, B1, . . . , Bm we have
∑
i aiP (Ai | C) <
∑
i biP (Bi | C) if
and only if
∑
i aiPφ(Ai | C) <
∑
i biPφ(Bi | C).
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Proof. We first verify the axioms of probability for Pφ. Consider any P -
measurable event A. If P (A) = 0, then Pφ(A) = φ(P (A)) = 0 as φ
preserves reals. If P (A) > 0, then φ(P (A)) > 0 by increasingness and
real-preservation. Hence, we have Pφ(A) ≥ 0 since P (A) ≥ 0 for all A.
Next, since 1 is real, Pφ(Ω) = φ(P (Ω)) = φ(1) = 1.
Finally, if A and B are disjoint, then by linearity and the finite additivity
of P , we have Pφ(A ∪ B) = φ(P (A ∪ B)) = φ(P (A) + P (B)) = φ(P (A)) +
φ(P (B)) = Pφ(A) + Pφ(B).
Thus Pφ is a finitely additive probability, as condition (i) requires. Condi-
tions (ii)–(iv) are special cases of condition (v) (though (ii) also immediately
follows from the strict increasingness of φ).
So let’s prove (v). Suppose that a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm are real and that




aiP (Ai | C) <
∑
i
biP (Bi | C).








We don’t need to separately show the other direction of the biconditional in
(iv), because we can write P = (Pφ)φ−1 and apply the first direction with
Pφ in place of P and φ
−1 in place of φ, as φ is a bijection and its inverse
satisfies the conditions of the lemma as well.
Let Di = Ai ∩ C and Ei = Bi ∩ C. Then if we multiply both sides of
(1) by P (C) and both sides of (2) by Pφ(C), and apply the ratio definition






























And by the strict increasingness of φ, this is indeed equivalent to (3), thereby
completing the proof of (v). 
Proof of Theorem 1. By our lemmas, all that remains is to prove condition
(vi). Suppose first that P (C) ≈ 0. Then Pα(C) = αP (C) by definition
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of Pα. Moreover, P (A ∩ C) will also be infinitesimally close to zero, so
Pα(A ∩ C) = αP (A ∩ C). Thus
Pα(A | C) = Pα(A ∩ C)
Pα(C)
=
P (A ∩ C)
P (C)
= P (A | C),
as desired.
Now suppose that P (C) 6≈ 0. Let c1 = StdP (C). This is a non-zero real
number. Observe that if x is finite and a ≈ b with a 6≈ 0, then x/a ≈ x/b.
(For xa − xb = (b−a)xab , which is infinitesimally close to zero since b − a ≈ 0
while ab 6≈ 0.) Now, P (C) ≈ Pα(C) ≈ c1. Thus,
Pα(A | C) = Pα(A ∩ C)
P (C)
≈ Pα(A ∩ C)
c1
.
But if y > 0 is real and a ≈ b, then a/y ≈ b/y, so using the fact that
P (A ∩ C) ≈ Pα(A ∩ C):
Pα(A ∩ C)
c1




(6) Pα(A | C) ≈ P (A ∩ C)
c1
.
The right hand side of (6) does not depend on α, so all the values of the
left hand side as we vary α > 0 must be infinitesimally close. In particular,
P1(A | C) ≈ Pα(A | C), and since P1 = P , we have (vi) as desired. 
Proof of Proposition 1. As a convenient and usual abuse of notation, we
will consider “z” to be a constant denoting z in our preferred interpretation
in the model R∗, and other similar abuses will be perpetrated. Start by
noting that z cannot be defined over R in the first-order language of fields,
i.e., there is no formula F (a1, . . . , an, x) in the first order language of fields
with a1, . . . , an real-valued constants such that F (a1, . . . , an, z) holds in R∗
and ∀x(F (a1, . . . , an, x) → x = z). For if there were such a formula, then
∃!xF (a1, . . . , an, x) would hold in the model R∗. But by the transfer principle
for hyperreals (e.g., Keisler 2007, p. 9), likewise ∃!xF (a1, . . . , an, x) would
hold in the model R. Thus, there would be a real number u such that
F (a1, . . . , an, u), and this sentence would also hold in R∗ by the transfer
principle, which would imply that u = z, contradicting the fact that z is not
real.
Now let Σ0 be the set of all formulas F (x) in the first-order language of
fields with constants from R and at most one free variable x such that F (z) is
true in R∗ and let Σ1 be Σ0 with the addition of the formula z 6= x. Observe
that ‖Σ‖ = ‖R‖. Moreover, any finite subset of Σ is satisfiable over R∗, i.e.,
if F0(x), F1(x), . . . , Fn(x) are in Σ, then there is a u in R∗ that satisfies all
the formulas. To see this, without loss of generality, assume that F0(x) is
x 6= z and that F1(x), . . . , Fn(x) are in Σ0. Let F (x) be F1(x)∧ · · · ∧Fn(x).
Then z satisfies F (x) in R∗, and so by the observations of the previous
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paragraph it is false that ∃!xF (x) holds in R∗. Thus in R∗ there must be
another element besides z that satisfies F (x), say z′. This other element
then satisfies F0(x), and so it satisfies all of F0(x), F1(x), . . . , Fn(x). Hence
every finite subset of Σ is satisfiable over R∗.
Since R∗ is κ-saturated for κ > ‖R‖ = ‖Σ‖, it follows that Σ is satisfiable
over R∗. Suppose it is satisfied by z′. Then z′ 6= z, since x 6= z is one of
the formulas in Σ. Moreover, z 6= u for every real u, so the formula z 6= u
is in Σ0, so z
′ 6= u for every real u, and hence z′ /∈ R. Now define φ(x) = x
for x ∈ R and φ(z) = z′. Because z′ satisfies every formula with one free
variable that z satisfies, it follows that φ is a partial elementary embedding.
But a partial elementary embedding in a κ-saturated model of cardinality κ
extends to an automorphism of the model (Sacks, 2010, pp. 72–73), which
completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 2. By Proposition 1 and Lemma 4, we just need to prove
the analogue of (vi), namely that if P (C) > 0, then P (A | C) ≈ Pφ(A | C).
To see this, observe that because φ is a field isomorphism:










= φ(P (A | C)).
But φ(P (A | C)) ≈ P (A | C) which follows from the fact that φ(x) ≈ x
for all finite x ∈ R∗ (and P (A | C) is finite as it is between 0 and 1).
For suppose x is finite so we can write x = a + b for a real a and an
infinitesimal b. Since φ fixes the reals, φ(x) = φ(a) + φ(b) = a + φ(b). If
we can show that φ(b) is infinitesimal, it will follow that φ(x) ≈ a ≈ x. To
see that φ(b) is infinitesimal, fix any real c > 0. Then −c < b < c. Hence
φ(−c) < φ(b) < φ(c) as φ is a field isomorphism of R∗ to itself and hence
preserves order (for α ≤ β in a real-line if and only if there is a γ such
that β = α + γ2, and this algebraic characterization of ≤ is preserved by
field isomorphism). But φ(−c) = −c and φ(c) = c as φ fixes the reals. Thus
−c < φ(b) < c, and since this holds for all real c > 0, φ(b) is infinitesimal. 
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